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MaThe regulation of medical drugs and devices involves competing goals of assuring safety and efﬁcacy while providing
rapid movement of innovative therapies through the investigative and regulatory processes as quickly as possible.
The United States and the European Union approach these challenges in different ways. Whereas the United States
has always relied on a strictly centralized process through 1 agency, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the
European Commission synchronized the regulations of 28 different countries as they combined to create the
European Union. The FDA historically developed as a consumer protection agency, whereas the regulations from the
European Commission arose out of a need to harmonize inter-state commercial interests while preserving national
“autonomy.” Thus, whereas the FDA has the advantages of centralization and common rules, the European Union
regulates medical drug and device approvals through a network of centralized and decentralized agencies throughout
its member states. This study explores some of the similarities and differences in European and U.S. regulation of
drugs and devices, and discusses challenges facing each. (J Am Coll Cardiol Basic Trans Science 2016;1:399–412)
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access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).R egulation of the development and dissemina-tion of medical drugs and/or devices (DADs)involves competing interests: ensuring that
agents are both safe and effective, while facilitating
the movement of innovative therapies as rapidly as
possible through the investigative process to public
use. Balancing these goals falls globally in large mea-
sure to the Federal Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) in the United States, and to regional and
centralized regulatory bodies in the European Union
(EU) (1).
Controversy persists about the differences in U.S.
and EU regulatory processes, costs, and the time it can
take for a DAD to proceed from concept to approval
under the regulations of each. A frequently held
assertion is that slower FDA approval processes
deprive American citizens of effective DADs that are
available to Europeans (2), and critics have charac-
terized FDA processes as “slow, risk averse, andm the Department of Anesthesiology and Pain Medicine, University of W
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nuscript received June 21, 2016; accepted June 21, 2016.expensive” (3). However, the Institute of Medicine
determined that current FDA pre-marketing pro-
cedures for medical devices are insufﬁcient to assure
device safety, particularly those approved largely on
their similarity to previously cleared “predicate” de-
vices, rather than on prospective, randomized clinical
trials (4). In the EU, concerns abound that DADs may
be approved too quickly, to the detriment of patient
safety. In recent years, there have been calls to tighten
approval processes and to establish regulatory con-
sistency between the FDA and the EU. Efforts include
recent legislation in the U.S. Congress to facilitate
release in the United States of drugs that have already
achieved European approval (5). Proposed changes
to regulations of the European Commission (EC)
regarding device approval are under discussion (6),
but are vigorously opposed by both industry and pa-
tient groups insisting that it will impede availability of
innovative therapies to the public.ashington, Seattle, Washington. Dr. Van Norman has
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400A 2-part series published earlier in JACC:
Basic to Translational Science provided an
overview of FDA approval processes for
drugs and medical devices in the United
States (7,8). This review compares European
processes with those of the FDA, and dis-
cusses some of the challenges facing each.
BACKGROUND
The FDA was an outgrowth of a division of
the U.S. Patent Ofﬁce in the mid-19th cen-
tury, initially charged with ensuring that
medications on the public market were
effective as advertised. The Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938 subsequently
invested the agency with more rigorouspowers to ensure that drugs were not only effective,
but “safe” (9), and the FDA was ultimately given au-
thority to regulate medical devices in 1976 (10)
through legislation that was later amended in the
Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of
2002 (11). Although regulatory amendments have
been implemented to facilitate DAD transit from
concept to market, the powers and processes of the
FDA have stayed largely consistent since the 1970s,
and are authoritative for all 50 states.
The evolution of European regulation of DADs, by
contrast, ismuchmore recent, with signiﬁcant changes
after the formation of the EU in 1993. Before that,
regulation and marketing approval for DADs fell to its
(now)member states.Differences in regulations among
the states often impeded marketing and disbursement
of DADs across Europe, and in some cases fostered
“protectionist” legislation within states to shield sov-
ereign nations’ companies from ﬁerce market compe-
tition. Among the current 28 member states, many
interstate agencies have been reorganized. Clinical
trial applications are generally handled in the member
state, whereasmarketing applications are approved by
both state and central agencies in accordance with
regulations set forth by the EC.
EUROPEAN REGULATION OF DRUGS
Efforts to standardize European regulations regarding
drug approval ﬁrst came to fruition before the for-
mation of the EU, with the passage of EC Directive
65/65/EEC in 1965 (12). The directive deﬁned a med-
ical product as “any substance or combination of
substances which may be administered to human
beings or animals with a view to making a medical
diagnosis or to restoring, correcting, or modifying
physiological functions in human beings or in ani-
mals.” Under the directive, any medicinal productmarketed in the member states would ﬁrst pass
approval in the originating state (1,12,13). The direc-
tive established consistent guidelines throughout the
member states regarding the information that must
be submitted for approval: these items parallel regu-
lations of the FDA regarding investigational new drug
applications and new drug approval applications.
DRUG APPROVAL PROCESSES. Many of the pro-
cesses to approve drugs in the EU are similar to those
of the FDA (Figure 1). An investigator of a proposed
pharmaceutical ﬁrst obtains pre-authorization for use
of the drug in clinical trials. All European clinical
trials were regulated under the Clinical Trials Direc-
tive of the European Commission (2001/20/EC) (14),
later repealed and replaced in 2014 by Regulation No.
536/2014 of the European Parliament (15).
The drug then progresses through sequential
studies analogous to those in the United States: Phase I
trials conducted in a small number of healthy subjects
to clarify pharmacology and dose range, Phase II trials
conducted in several hundred patients with the target
condition to investigate the dose-response relation-
ship, and Phase III conﬁrmatory trials in several hun-
dred to several thousand patients to substantiate
safety and efﬁcacy. As in the United States, the EC
provides means for approving “orphan drugs,” or
those that treat conditions that affect so few people
that randomized controlled trials may be impossible to
complete (16,17). There are also methods for obtaining
conditional approval for drugs to be used in emergency
conditions, or other conditional approvals (18).
The European Medicines Agency (EMA) was
formed in 1995 with funding from the EU, pharma-
ceutical industry, and member states (19). The EMA
was charged with harmonizing processes in the
member state regulatory agencies to reduce annual
costs to drug companies (that previously were
required to obtain separate approvals in each member
state) as well as to eliminate competition-restricting
regulation in sovereign states. However, the EMA
does not oversee all drug approvals the way the FDA
does in the United States. In Europe, there are 4
routes by which a drug can be approved, depending
on the drug class and manufacturer preference (6).
CENTRALIZED PROCESS. The centralized process is
controlled through the EMA. Every member state of
the EU is represented on the EMA Committee for
Medicinal Products, which issues a single license
valid in all EU member states. This route of approval
is mandatory for some classes of drugs, such as
treatments for HIV/AIDS, oncology, diabetes, neuro-
degenerative disorders, autoimmune disease, and
viral diseases.
FIGURE 1 Comparison of Drug Approval Processes in the United States and EU
After clinical trials, FDA drug approvals follow a centralized path, whereas European approval can occur through 4 different paths, depending on the nature
of the drug and the preference of the manufacturer. EIND ¼ emergency investigational new drug; EMA ¼ European Medicines Agency; EU ¼ European
Union; FDA ¼ Food and Drug Administration; IND ¼ investigational new drug.
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401NATIONAL PROCESS. Each EU state can have its
own procedures for approving drugs that fall
outside of those required to undergo the centralized
process.
MUTUAL RECOGNITION. Drugs approved in one EU
state via that state’s national process can obtain
marketing authorization in another EU member state.DECENTRALIZED PROCEDURE. Manufacturers can
apply for simultaneous approval in more than 1 EU
state for products that have not yet been authorized
in any EU state and do not fall under the mandatory
centralized process. This route now manages by far
the largest number of applications for approval: in
2008, there were 1,400 decentralized applications,
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402compared with 100 applications via the centralized
process (6).
CONTRASTS IN FDA AND
EU DRUG APPROVAL PROCESSES
Comparisons and contrasts between the U.S. and
European processes for drug approval are plentiful,
but 2 issues have elicited particular scrutiny: the time
required for drug approvals, and transparency of
nonpublished drug trials data.
TIME FROM CONCEPT TO MARKET. Shortening time
from concept to market is not only important to pa-
tients. During that period in a drug or device’s life, it
generates costs rather than revenue for its sponsor.
For drugs, most of that time, in both Europe and the
United States, is spent in clinical trials that can
consume years and generate costs in the millions or
even billions of dollars (7). Thus, some proposals in
Europe have called for earlier market release of drugs
once they have completed Phase II clinical trials, with
post-market surveillance thereafter to continually
assess patient safety and drug efﬁcacy (20).
Another determinant of the concept to market
period is the time it takes the regulatory agencies to
conduct their reviews. It is commonly asserted that
FDA processes are signiﬁcantly slower than those of
the EMA, and that FDA processes should be loosened
to facilitate drug approval and equalize drug avail-
ability in Europe and the United States. Closer exam-
ination shows that, in fact, drug review times are
signiﬁcantly shorter at the FDA than the EMA. One
study demonstrated that for similar drugs, the median
times of initial reviews were 303 and 366 days,
respectively, and for full reviews was 322 days
compared with 366 days, respectively (21). For drugs
that were brought to market in both the United States
and EU, 63.7% were brought to market ﬁrst in the
United States, and were available a median of 90 days
sooner. Comparing ﬁrst-to-market times between the
United States and Canada, 85.7% of drugs were avail-
able ﬁrst in the United States, and a median of 355 days
sooner (21). Roberts et al. (22) found that for cancer
drugs, review times were even more abbreviated—by
about 6 months in the United States. All of the drugs
that were approved by both the FDA and EMA were
available sooner to patients in the United States, in
part because of consistently shorter review times at
the FDA. Furthermore, during the same period of
time, the FDA approved a larger number of cancer
drugs than the EMA (35 vs. 29, respectively) (22).
TRANSPARENCY OF DRUG APPROVAL DATA. Not all
data generated for drug approval is ultimately sub-
mitted for peer review and publication, and this canbe a signiﬁcant source of publication bias (23).
Transparency of trial data is an issue for both the FDA
and EMA, which poses challenges to the production
of systematic reviews and meta-analyses that may be
critical to public safety and health. At the FDA, non-
published data included in new drug applications is
available for review online (24) and by request.
MacLean et al. (25) found the methodological quality
of these studies generally comparable to that of
published trials, and conﬁrm they can be invaluable
in systematic reviews. In contrast to the FDA, at the
EMA, nonpublished data is considered “commercially
sensitive” and not available to the public unless there
is an overriding public interest. Gøtzsche and
Jørgensen (26) detailed their years-long struggle to
obtain unpublished trial data from the EMA in 2011.
EUROPEAN REGULATION OF DEVICES
Approval processes for medical devices also followed
a path of “harmonization” in Europe with establish-
ment of the EU, but medical device regulation also
does not fall solely to any one agency.
Three EC directives that have been subject to pe-
riodic amendment address approval of medical de-
vices: 1) implantable devices are regulated under
directive 90/385/EC; 2) most other devices are regu-
lated under directive 93/42/EC; and 3) in vitro diag-
nostic devices (i.e., used on substances produced by
the body) are regulated under 98/79/EC (27,28). Un-
der Directive 93/42/EC, the deﬁnition of a medical
device is “any instrument, apparatus, appliance,
material or other article, whether used alone or in
combination, including the software necessary for its
proper application intended by the manufacturer to
be used for human beings for the purpose of diag-
nosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment or allevia-
tion of disease; diagnosis, monitoring, treatment,
alleviation of or compensation for an injury or
handicap; investigation, replacement or modiﬁcation
of the anatomy or of a physiological process; control
of conception; and which does not achieve its
principal intended action in or on the human body
by pharmacological, immunological, or metabolic
means, but which may be assisted in its function by
such means” (29).
In the EU, every marketed medical device must
carry a Conformité Européenne (CE) mark indicating
that it conforms to relevant directives set forth in the
EC Medical Device Directives of the EU. A device with
a CE mark can be marketed in any EU member state.
Medical devices that are non-implantable and
considered low risk are “self-marked,” meaning that
the manufacturer itself simply certiﬁes compliance
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403and applies a CE mark (30). High-risk devices must
undergo a more extensive outside review.
Through a complex system of legislation, high-risk
medical device approval applications can be ﬁled in
any member state and reviewed by a “Notiﬁed Body”
(NB) established within that state and authorized by
that state’s Competent Authority, or health agency, to
assess and assure conformity with requirements of
the relevant EC directive (27). NBs are private com-
panies that contract with manufacturers to supply
these certiﬁcations for a fee, and there are currently
around 76 NBs in the EU. Once the NB agrees that the
device meets requirements for conformity, the NB
issues a CE mark, and the device can then be mar-
keted in EU member states (31).
Until recently, the CE mark authorized marketing
“without further controls and no further evaluation”
(32), but new regulations in 2010 tightened re-
quirements for approval of devices based on their
similarity to previous “predicate” devices. They also
required “proactive post-market surveillance” of de-
vices by their manufacturers (33). Post-marketing
surveillance events (e.g., alerts, modiﬁcations, recall,
and withdrawal of products) are required in the new
regulations to be reported to a central database
(Eudamed) to facilitate dissemination of information
of adverse events throughout Europe. The database
is currently available only to the EC and Competent
Authorities, not to the public (30,34). According to
Emergo, a global medical device consulting ﬁrm, the
“Future Eudamed Steering Committee” met in
January of 2016 and discussed widening Eudamed
accessibility to NBs, manufacturers, experts, non-
European Competent Authorities, medical in-
stitutions, the public, and the press (35).
COMPARISON OF U.S. AND EU DEVICE APPROVAL.
Approval of medical devices in both the EU and the
United States share some similarities (Figure 2). The
FDA assigns devices to 3 main regulatory classes: low
risk or Class I, moderate risk or Class II, and high risk
or Class III (Table 1). In the United States, a Class I
device requires merely a Premarket Notiﬁcation
without clinical trials, whereas Class III devices
require clinical trials and/or other evidence, unless
they are not substantially different from an
already-marketed Class III device. If they are similar
to a previously approved predicate device, they can
usually forgo clinical testing, or undergo only limited
clinical investigations. About 75% of Class II devices in
the United States require some form of clinical trials to
demonstrate their safety and that they perform as
expected, although the level of evidence required for
approval is often less rigorous than that for new drugapproval (8). Randomized controlled trials, for
example, are uncommon because of difﬁculties in
randomization and blinding, and many devices are
approved based on small observational studies (36).
In Europe, the European Council New Approach
Directives (3,28) deﬁned “Essential Requirements”
that apply to all countries to ensure devices’ safety
and performance. The EC assigns devices into 4
classes (Table 1). Class I or low risk devices need only
“self-declare” that they conform with the Essential
Requirements to the national Competent Authority in
their country of origin (30,37). In the United
Kingdom, for example, the Competent Authority is
the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory
Agency (MHRA).
Moderate- and high-risk devices (Classes IIa, IIb,
and III) require clinical and/or nonclinical evidence to
support approval. As in the United States, if a device
is shown to be substantially similar to an already
approved device, data from the predicate device may
be used to support approval, and new clinical testing
may not be needed (38).
DIFFERENCES IN THE FDA AND EU DEVICE APPROVAL
PROCESSES. Although drug review and approval
processes are in many ways similar between the
United States and Europe, critical differences exist
between the approaches to device approval, largely
rooted in the historical origins and commissions of
the agencies responsible.
The FDA was established as a central answer to the
problem of the increasing marketing of health prod-
ucts for which beneﬁts were unproven, nonexistent,
or minimal, and products that were frankly harmful
(7). By contrast, the European system of NBs was
developed out of initiatives to foster innovation and
commercial and industrial policies in Europe, and not
as a public health or consumer protection agency.
Protection of the public health in Europe is the com-
mission of the Competent Authority established in
each of the member states, and their roles and au-
thority vary widely depending on the state. Indeed,
as an employee of ITC, one of the NBs in the Czech
Republic stated, NBs are “on the side of the manu-
facturer and their products, not on the side of pa-
tients” (39). Although the CE mark is often mistakenly
equated to being a seal of quality, in fact achieving a
CE mark merely indicates that the device in question
is in full compliance with European legislation. A
report to the U.S. Congress of the Global Legal
Research Center points out that “The legal value of
the CE marking lies in its proof that the medical de-
vice concerned is in full compliance with applicable
legislation. On the other hand, the CE marking does
FIGURE 2 Comparison of Device Approval Processes in the United States and EU
The FDA processes for device approvals are centralized within 1 agency, but allow device approvals based on clinical trials, or based on predicate devices.
European processes for device approval follow decentralized paths in each of the member states and also allow for approval based on predicate devices.
CE ¼ Conformité Européenne; NB ¼ Notifying Body; other abbreviations as in Figure 1.
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404not represent quality, even though consumers often
assume that products bearing the CE marking are of
better quality than others” (37).
Before approval of a medical device in the United
States, a device must not only be shown to be safe,
but efﬁcacious (3). Medical devices approved in
Europe need only to demonstrate safety and perfor-
mance, that is, that they perform or, in the case de-
vices approved based on predicates rather than
clinical trials, will probably perform as designed andthat potential beneﬁts outweigh potential risks. They
are not required to demonstrate clinical efﬁcacy. A
collateral effect of more “commercially sensitive”
regulations in Europe is that initial approval of U.S.
company-backed devices is increasingly being sought
in the EU before application in the United States (40).
Another challenge for EU processes is that, whereas
only 1 organization (the FDA) oversees medical device
development and approval in the United States,
a complex mesh of organizations with various
TABLE 1 Risk Classiﬁcation of Medical Devices in the United States and Europe
United States European Union
Class I: low risk of illness or injury,
e.g., gauze, toothbrushes
Class I: low risk; e.g., sterile dressings,
gloves
Class II: moderate risk of illness or injury,
e.g., suture, needles
Class IIa: low-medium risk; e.g., surgical
blades, suction equipment
Class IIb: medium to high risk; e.g., ventilators,
some implants, radiotherapy equipment
Class III: signiﬁcant risk of illness or injury; e.g.,
pacemakers, implantable deﬁbrillators
Class III: high risk; e.g., drug-eluting cardiac
stents, pacemakers, implantable
deﬁbrillators
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405allegiances are responsible for oversight in the EU—
including government agencies (Competent Author-
ities) and private, for-proﬁt companies (NBs). In the
United States, the single authority system presumably
allows for better coordination and enforcement, but
may result in a less ﬂexible, lengthy, and expensive
process (30). The EU process, by contrast, may provide
more ﬂexibility and more rapid approval of devices,
but its rules are more difﬁcult to deﬁne and enforce.
Standards among the NBs differ, and this provides
manufacturers with loopholes to expedite approval by
seeking a CE mark from the least rigorous NB and
those that charge the lowest fees (39,41). NBs as pri-
vate companies not only compete from a pricing
standpoint for approval contracts, but may be reluc-
tant to disapprove devices for fear of losing an
ongoing relationship with a manufacturer who hires
them. A lack of centralization makes safety data more
difﬁcult to collate, and in any case, data submitted
for high-risk devices to the NBs is considered
“commercially conﬁdential,” and is not available to
the public (2,41,42).
The FDA must approve all high-risk medical de-
vices in the United States, but in Europe, some high-
risk devices, such as those that are not intended for
“distribution and/or use on the Community Market,”
are not approved under the Medical Devices Direc-
tive. A device produced “in house”—for example, in
an academic medical center—could theoretically be
distributed for widespread use throughout that aca-
demic system and its associated entities without
having ever undergone scrutiny for safety and per-
formance, and it would not require a CE mark (28).
Cohen (39) from the British Medical Journal (BMJ)
demonstrated some of the loopholes in the EU
process for device approval. The BMJ investigators
pursued EU approval for the Changi TMH (total metal
hip), an entirely ﬁctitious metal-on-metal hip pros-
thesis deliberately modeled (on paper) on a predicate
product that had been recalled for unacceptable fail-
ure rates. Although the ﬁctitious BMJ product data
also indicated that their proposed prosthesis pro-
duced potentially toxic levels of metal ions in the
body, the NB to which the investigators ﬁnally sub-
mitted their application raised no signiﬁcant issues
with regard to product design.
The investigators learned that few devices actually
fail approval, with at least 1 NB explicitly offering a
“100% success rate.” Furthermore, the actual country
of manufacture of devices was easy as well as legal to
conceal; the NB ofﬁce approached by the in-
vestigators was located in South Korea (allowed un-
der EU regulations), and the NB suggested they
establish a European distribution hub so that theproduct could carry package labeling indicating it was
from the EU (also legal under EU regulations) even
though it would be manufactured in Asia (39,43).
Differences in DAD approval processes in the
United States and Europe cannot entirely be attrib-
uted to the regulators or even the manufacturers.
Product liability lawsuits are less common in Europe
than in the United States. This may reﬂect differences
in liability laws, as well as differences in how
comfortable European patients are with clinical risks,
compared with those in the United States.
TIMELINES TO DEVICE APPROVAL AND USE. The
biotech industry is vocal in asserting that U.S. DAD
approval is much slower than in Europe, and that
European patients enjoy earlier access to innovative
drugs and technology over U.S. patients. Independent
analysis of device “lag times” between the EU and the
United States is difﬁcult, because there is no central
European clearinghouse for such information, and
applications for device approvals seldom occur
simultaneously in Europe and the United States. A
“device lag” of 3 years between the EU and United
States approval is frequently quoted from a 2012
report of the Boston Consulting Group, which was
hired by the biotech industry to support changes in
European regulations for device approval (44).
Kramer et al. (45) examined comparisons in device
approval timing between the FDA and the EU, and
found that whereas devices approved via the more
stringent FDA pre-market approval (PMA) approval
process did indeed lag about 3 years behind EU
approvals, devices approved via the FDA 501(k)
approval process only differed by about 18 days as of
2010. In a subset of devices cleared via the 501(k)
process that did not require clinical evidence, FDA
approval was faster than EU approval. Since 2006, the
vast majority of Class III devices are approved in the
United States via the 501(k) process (46).
In addition, approval does not equate with avail-
ability to patients. Analysis shows that although time
for regulatory reviews may be longer in the United
States, the timeline from application to clinical
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406availability of devices in the United States is similar to
or shorter than in the EU. This is largely because in
Europe, once a device is approved it is still subject to
reimbursement approval before becoming available
for patient use, and reimbursement decisions take
considerably longer in the EU than in the United
States (47).
Approval and adoption timelines do not tell the
whole story, nor even possibly the most important
part of the story regarding device availability to pa-
tients. Critical questions are: 1) does faster DAD
approval equate with greater availability of “innova-
tive” and better clinical therapies; and 2) is there
evidence that patients have been or would be harmed
by reducing regulatory hurdles to DAD approval?
The evidence that faster approvals for either drugs
or devices improve availability of signiﬁcantly better
DADs is lacking. Only 3 in 20 new drug approvals in
Germany in 2011 were deemed improvements over
previous therapies (48). Di Mario et al. (49) assert
that, even though over 10 times as many drug-eluting
coronary stents are now approved in the EU than in
the United States, many do not offer signiﬁcant ad-
vantages, or actually have worse outcomes than
existing devices. In the words of Rita Redberg, editor
of JAMA Internal Medicine”.we need to be more
speciﬁc about ‘innovation’. Most new devices are not
innovative” (44).
Wild et al. (2) reviewed 10 high-risk cardiovascular
devices (for arterial and coronary artery angioplasty,
renal denervation, endovascular aortic repair, atrial
appendage closure, and others uses) already
approved in Austria and marketed in the EU, that
were then subjected to FDA application. They asked
whether more rigorous clinical investigation or
further investigation would have changed perspec-
tives on these devices. For 4 devices, application to
the FDA was suspended or withdrawn due to safety
concerns, 2 devices either failed to show improved
efﬁcacy over existing devices or had unknown efﬁ-
cacy, and clinical trials for another device (for endo-
vascular aortic repair) were subsequently suspended
due to an unexpected high number of reinterven-
tions. Time lag between approval in Europe to
approval in the United States (for those that were able
to obtain FDA approval) was 3 to 7 years. Analysis of
the quality of clinical evidence in the Wild study (2)
was limited because no data on clinical evidence
used for CE marking were available due to conﬁden-
tiality regulations.
Early device release and adoption does not always
predict beneﬁts for patients, whether approved in the
United States or Europe. Renal artery stenting widely
adopted in the 1980s, was debunked by the ASTRAL(Angioplasty and Stent for Renal Artery Lesions) trial,
which demonstrated no efﬁcacy over drug therapy,
and high rates of serious complications, including
amputations and death (50). The Cerecyte coil (Micrus
Endovascular, San Jose, California), a treatment of
intracranial aneurysms, was approved in the United
States via the less stringent 501(k) process on the basis
of predicate devices, and the manufacturer was able
to charge a premium for the coil without having to
supply prospective clinical data. Post-market clinical
trials proved efﬁcacy, but nonsuperiority over other
less expensive existing devices (51).
CONTINUING CHALLENGES TO DRUG AND
DEVICE REGULATION AND APPROVAL
The EU and United States face some common chal-
lenges in balancing the mandate to ensure DAD safety
and efﬁcacy against the pressure from industry
and the public to expedite the transit of new DADs to
market.
SAFETY AND EFFICACY EVIDENCE REQUIREMENTS.
Appropriate and effective evidentiary requirements
for device approval is a serious problem for both the
United States and EU. In the United States, only about
2% of medical devices approved in the last 10 to 12
years have undergone Premarket Applications, the
most rigorous process for FDA device approval (52). A
2006 report states that only 10% to 15% of FDA device
submissions contain any clinical data at all (30).
Approximately 71% of devices in 1 study had been
cleared through the less rigorous 501(k) process, and
another 7% were exempted entirely from review (53).
These statistics do not begin to address quality issues
plaguing product applications, which the FDA itself
has determined to occur in more than one-half of
submissions (54).
When clinical trials are required for devices, they
frequently do not meet the same strict standards for
clinical evidence that are required for drugs; they are
often nonrandomized, nonblinded, do not have
active control groups and lack hard endpoints (30). In
fact, such rigorous clinical trials may not always be
feasible—randomization and blinding of patients or
physicians for implantable devices is nearly impos-
sible. But device approval based on predicates raises
serious doubts about safety assurances, and both the
Institute of Medicine (4) and the U.S. Congress, under
the 1990 Safe Medical Devices Act (55), have pushed
to have this pathway for approval of devices cur-
tailed. Nevertheless, 19 types of Class III devices were
still allowed as of 2013 to reach patients via an FDA
clearance based on predicates (56). It is worrisome
that predicates can include devices that were on the
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407market before regulatory requirements to prove
safety and efﬁcacy existed, and even voluntarily
recalled devices (52,53,57). Thus, it is not uncommon
for a medical device to reach the market in the United
States without ever having been tested in humans.
Such was the case with the DePuy ASR LX Acetabular
Cup System, a metal-on-metal hip replacement
product that later suffered an unacceptable high rate
of failure and was recalled (8).
In the EU, in contrast with the United States, reg-
ulations do not require rigorous clinical studies to
support clinical efﬁcacy for any devices, even those
without predicates, but merely evidence to support
safety and performance. Often, evidence takes the
form of laboratory testing or very limited clinical tri-
als (58). This raises the risk that a device will be
approved that offers no substantial advantages or
beneﬁts over existing products, or else that the gen-
eral public will be exposed to serious adverse effects
that were not detected in limited clinical experience.
In 2009, the chief executive ofﬁcer of the French drug
agency stood squarely in sympathy with industry
when he stated in the preface for a book distributed
by Medtronic Corporation that “rapid obsolescence of
the products.is hardly compatible with the delay
necessary for clinical trials, particularly morbidity and
mortality data.” He suggested that “predictive equiv-
alence” should replace clinical testing—referring to a
chapter in the book that suggests predictive equiva-
lence can be based onmerely a successful bench test of
a medical device (50,59).
In both the United States and the EU, the lack of
requirement for rigorous new clinical evidence to
approve the majority of medical devices and the use of
predicate data can furthermore have a palling effect
on the motivation of industry to conduct expensive
trials to demonstrate clinical efﬁcacy or superiority, as
well as on the pursuit of truly new innovation (60).TABLE 2 Classes of FDA Recalls and Alerts*
Class I recall Reasonable probability that use or exposure to a de
result in serious adverse health consequences o
Class II recall Use or exposure may cause temporary or medically r
adverse health consequences; probability of ser
adverse health consequences is remote
Class III recall Use or exposure is unlikely to cause adverse health
consequences
Market withdrawal Manufacturer-initiated: product has a minor violatio
would not be subject to FDA action
Medical device safety
alert
Advisory that a medical device may present an unre
risk of substantial harm; in some cases, such ale
also considered recalls
*From the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), available at: http://www.fda.gov/SPOST-MARKET SAFETY AND EFFICACY SURVEILLANCE.
In the United States, physicians, manufacturers, and
patients have the ability to report adverse events
involving DADs to the FDA, which centrally collects
and reviews adverse event data. The FDA has the
power to condition approval of DADs on the comple-
tion of post-marketing studies, and may even deter-
mine what the design of such studies should be.
Ultimately, if an after-market drug or device is found
to be unsafe, the FDA can withdraw its marketing
approval and require the manufacturer to withdraw/
recall it; the different classes of recall are summarized
in Table 2. Failure to recall a device would then
constitute a federal crime. Reports and actions taken
by the FDA are publically available (61). Discovery of
inherent ﬂaws in the theory, design, manufacture, or
marketing of a DAD exposes the manufacturer, as well
as medical establishments and physicians, to the full
force of the American civil liabilities laws. Manufac-
turers may also be subject to criminal charges, as
when Guidant LLC was charged in 2010 for allegedly
concealing information regarding catastrophic fail-
ures of implantable cardioverter-deﬁbrillator devices
(62). A recent review of FDA drug recalls from 2004 to
2011 demonstrated that most Class I recalls (in which
product defects had the greatest likelihood of causing
patient harm) were due to contamination or wrong
dose or release mechanisms. Five recalls were initi-
ated due to patient adverse events (63).
European drug safety regulation relies heavily on
post-market surveillance, through “vigilance sys-
tems” required under the 2012 EC pharmacovigilance
legislation (EU/20/2012) (64,65). Adverse drug re-
actions are reported to the Competent Authority of
each member nation, or their authorized surrogate: in
the United Kingdom, for example, that is the MHRA.
The 2012 legislation provided signiﬁcant new powers
to the EMA to ask for post-marketing safety andvice will
r death
Examples: defective implantable deﬁbrillator; critical labeling
error on a drug
eversible
ious
Examples: a drug that is understrength, but not used to treat a
serious illness
Examples: unlikely to cause health effects, but violate FDA
labeling or manufacturing laws, such as a lack of English
labeling on a retail food
n that Examples: routine updates and equipment adjustments and
repairs. This differs from a voluntary “recall” in that a recall
involves a violation that would be subject to FDA action
asonable
rts are
Example: notiﬁcation to the public of a serious defect in an
implantable deﬁbrillator
afety/Recalls/ucm165546.htm. Accessed June 17, 2016.
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408efﬁcacy studies. The speciﬁc methods for collecting
and analyzing reports are left to each state’s Compe-
tent Authority.
Some proposals have called for quicker drug ap-
provals based on Phase II clinical studies, coupled
with heavier reliance on post-marketing surveillance,
as a way of balancing availability and safety (20).
However, this approach presents several problems.
Almost one-half of drugs fail in Phase III clinical trials
due to safety and efﬁcacy concerns (66,67). Quicker
approval based on more exploratory clinical studies,
therefore, virtually guarantees that patients will be
exposed to drugs that later prove to have little clinical
beneﬁt, or worse, potential serious harm. Such was
the case with geﬁtinib (Iressa, AstraZeneca, London,
United Kingdom), which achieved accelerated
approval on the basis of Phase II clinical trials, but
was later restricted by the FDA on the basis of ran-
domized double-blind study results (68). Another
problem is the fact that for the majority of accelerated
drug approvals that have been “conditional” on the
completion of post-market studies by the FDA, post-
market safety and efﬁcacy studies were not actually
completed (69).
A review of conditional approvals by the EMA also
reveals problems; in one review of 26 conditionally
approved medications (70), over one-half were con-
verted to standard approval processes, and 5 had
already exceeded deadlines for meeting conditions at
the time of the review. Average time to address the
obligations of the conditional approval was 4 years,
but ranged as high as 7.7 years. Conditional approvals
were most often offered to cancer drugs and orphan
drugs. The investigators commented that a recently
proposed “adaptive pathway” or “live licensing” that
would open up conditional approval (requiring much
lower levels of clinical evidence) to more drugs
“could pave the way to further marketing authoriza-
tion strategies allowing access to medicines whose
clinical value is still not fully established” (70).
Finally, approval of drugs based on Phase II studies
may reduce the willingness of patients to even enroll
in randomized controlled trials that might restrict
their access to new drugs, making safety and efﬁcacy
studies more difﬁcult or impossible to accomplish
(68).
In Europe, the mixture of government and private
processes makes post-market surveillance chal-
lenging (36), and although device manufacturers are
responsible for reporting adverse effects, it is not
clear how diligently they are required to look for
product defects, nor to search for adverse events (71).
The post-marketing surveillance plan that was
accepted for the BMJ’s factitious hip prosthesisconsisted solely of listing the phone number of an
employee of the “manufacturer” as a contact on their
brochures (39).
Calls for reform in the European process for device
approval and post-market surveillance were fueled in
2010 after Poly Implant Prosthèse (PIP), a French
company that manufactured silicone breast implants
under a CE mark issued in 1991, was found to have
switched to industrial silicone rather than medical
grade material in their implants. Over 30,000 women
received PIP implants, which were implicated in cases
of systemic toxicity, as well as cancer (72). Before PIP
changed to lower grade components (sometime in
2001), their implant had been refused approved for
marketing in the United States on the basis of a post-
market surveillance process. In 1992, the FDA began
requiring follow-up of all patients receiving breast
implants through post-market clinical trials. When
higher than expected complication rates were found,
the FDA required all breast implants to undergo
evaluation via the stringent PMA approval process.
PIP’s PMA application failed in 2000, based on an FDA
inspection of their manufacturing plant (which
resulted in a warning letter to the company) and
clinical and safety data that the FDA determined was
insufﬁcient (72,73).
Despite success regarding defective breast im-
plants, FDA post-market surveillance processes and
FDA and manufacturer recalls are fraught with de-
ﬁciencies. For example, it took more than 3 years to
recognize safety issues and recall the Sprint Fidelis
(Medtronic, Minneapolis, Minnesota) implantable
cardioverter-deﬁbrillator, which had a high pro-
pensity for lead fracture that lead to patient deaths.
Over 268,000 patients received the device, and had to
consider whether they should undergo removal of the
device with its attendant risks (74). In another case,
concerns were raised regarding the Riata ST deﬁbril-
lator leads (St. Jude Medical, Sylmar, California),
which was prone to a type of “inside-out” conductor
erosion that would predispose to lead failure. The
company concluded, based on product analysis and
complaints, that the risk of insulation abrasion was
0.63%, of which only about 15% might cause a clinical
problem. However, several small clinical studies
indicated that “inside-out” insulation erosion
occurred in up to 30% of implanted leads (75). The
leads were withdrawn from the market in 2011, more
than 10 years after market release, following reports
of alarming rates of lead erosion (15%) and lead fail-
ures (76). A later analysis conducted by Hauser et al.
(77) identiﬁed 71 deaths in patients with Riata leads,
22 of which were conﬁrmed in Riata or Riata ST leads
to be lead-related. Comparing the experiences with
J A C C : B A S I C T O T R A N S L A T I O N A L S C I E N C E V O L . 1 , N O . 5 , 2 0 1 6 Van Norman
A U G U S T 2 0 1 6 : 3 9 9 – 4 1 2 FDA and EU Approval of Drugs and Devices
409the Spring Fidelis and Riata leads, Liu et al. (76)
commented that, despite “early identical patterns,”
reasons for the delay in the Riata lead recall compared
with that of the Spring Fidelis were unclear, and
speculated that it might be in part due to failures in
the manufacturer-to-FDA reporting system.
Reliance on post-marketing surveillance to assess
the experience with devices and device safety relies
on the accuracy and quantity of data reported by
manufacturers, which, as Kaszala and Ellenbogen (75)
point out, “is not adjudicated by the Food and Drug
Administration.” Post-market data are furthermore
subject to underreporting of clinical events to the
manufacturer by health care providers. In the words
of Hauser (78), “our current passive post-marketing
surveillance system fails to detect signiﬁcant device
defects before large patient populations have been
exposed.”
European law requires the manufacturer to report
adverse events that they know about to the member
state in which the CE mark was obtained (28), and the
individual states have the responsibility for restrict-
ing or withdrawing the device. Failure of a manu-
facturer to comply can result in criminal penalties.
Penalties for noncompliance differ signiﬁcantly,
depending on the member states. Extrapolating from
several reports, in the United Kingdom, this might
result in a ﬁne of £5,000 ($7,257.50) and imprison-
ment of up to 6 months, France can impose ﬁnes of up
to approximately V48,000 ($65,760) and imprison-
ment of up to 3 years, and Germany can impose un-
limited ﬁnes and prison terms of 3 to 5 years (28).
Individuals harmed by a defective medical device
have 3 courses of action in Europe: actions in contract
or negligence, both of which are subject to individual
laws and processes of the member state, and action
under the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EC (79).
However, the complexity of bringing suit in the maze
of agencies, ofﬁces, distributers and manufacturers is
daunting.
The lack of transparency regarding data submitted
for clinical approval, and the lack of a central
“clearing house” in the EU to manage device approval
make it nearly impossible to make accurate compar-
isons of EU and U.S. rates and industrial interventions
for unsafe and inferior medical devices. Kramer et al.
(3) state that “studies in the EU regarding the
premarket features of devices that are subject to re-
calls have proved impossible to conduct.” One study
of device recalls and safety alerts reported to the
MHRA in the United Kingdom showed that a large
number of medical device safety alerts were related
to cardiovascular devices, and 44% of all device
safety alerts lead to recall. But many manufacturerswould not supply requested details about the recall,
and frequently simply did not respond to such re-
quests at all (80). For the United States, one report
estimates that 6 to 8 devices are removed from the
U.S. market annually due to safety concerns (81).
Another analysis of cardiovascular and non-
cardiovascular device recalls in the United States
indicated that device recall rates were relatively
constant over an 8-year period at approximately 30
per year. The largest proportion of recalls were for
cardiovascular devices (27%). In the last year of the
study, recall rates for devices approved under the
501(k) “predicate” approval process doubled from
0.65% to 1.39% (82), reinforcing concerns about the
501(k) process.
Many have called for centralizing processes for
device approval in the EU, similar to the way in which
approval is accomplished with the FDA; this would
facilitate standardization of regulations, decrease
variance of pricing and processes, restrict question-
able practices by the NBs, and reduce conﬂicts of in-
terest in the approval process. But the price for
standardization would likely be increased cost,
increased time to approval, and decreased ﬂexibility
for industry. Industry has responded vigorously to
proposals to tighten regulations and processes, call-
ing them “Kafkaesque” and “harmful to patients”
(44).
THE FUTURE. Recognizing a common goal of patient
safety, in the wake of the 2012 vigilance legislation,
the EMA and the FDA announced a program of
collaboration to reinforce efforts in medication safety
by holding regular teleconference meetings to discuss
“areas that have been identiﬁed as requiring an
intensiﬁed exchange of information and collabora-
tion” (83).
A 2012 proposal for amendments to the EC’s regu-
lations on medical devices (37,84) that would involve
the EMA in device regulation and ﬁnal review after
NB approval and before release, tighten quality con-
trols over NBs and require stricter clinical evidence
for device approval, among other changes. The mea-
sure has been the subject of ongoing debate, and
initial hopes for adoption of new rules by 2014 were
not met. It remains to be seen whether they will be
passed by the end of 2017.
SUMMARY
Globally, the largest share of medical DADs are
investigated and approved in the United States and in
the EU. Although the regulatory processes in the
United States and Europe share common goals and
have many similarities, the different histories of DAD
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410regulation in both regions contribute to signiﬁcant
regulatory dissimilarities. Whereas the FDA was
founded as a centralized consumer protection
agency, the current European systems were driven
out of a need to standardize commercial rules across
the European member states. As a result, the FDA is
sometimes seen as overplaying safety concerns at the
cost of commercial enterprise, whereas the European
systems are sometimes characterized as being pri-
marily concerned with preserving commercial in-
terests to the detriment of patient safety. Despite
assertions that drugs are approved more slowly in the
United States, analysis indicates that they actually
reach the public more quickly in the United States
than Europe. Whether there is a true “device lag”between Europe and the United States is less clear.
Nevertheless, device safety concerns and device
failures on both sides of the “pond” have lead both
the United States and EU to seek greater mutual
cooperation, and to explore tightening regulation
regarding device approvals. Legislative efforts in both
the United States and EU are currently underway to
promote transparency and mutual standardization of
DAD approval processes.
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